We perform an asset market experiment in order to investigate whether overconfidence induces trading.
Introduction
We present experimental evidence investigating the link between overconfidence and trading activity in an asset market setting. The calibration-based variant of overconfidence (CBO), namely the overestimation of knowledge precision (e.g., Lichtenstein et al (1982) ), is stressed. While a relationship between CBO and trading is an implication of some behavioral models (e.g., Odean (1998) ), the intuition behind the relationship is clear: the more certain you are of your view, the less credence you will accord those of others and the more likely you will be to transact at a price perceived favorable to your view. 1 Since there are other manifestations of overconfidence and it is not clear which matter more for financial decision-making, we also investigate the role of the better-than-average effect (BTA), the tendency for most people to see themselves as smarter or more skilled than average (e.g., Taylor and Brown (1988) ); and illusion of control (IoC), stemming from the exaggerated belief of control over external events (e.g., Langer (1975) ).
Field research has preceded experimental work.
Nevertheless, a connection between overconfidence and trading activity in naturally-occurring markets can at best be circumstantial, since it is not obvious who in a group of real-world traders is overconfident and who is not. Barber and Odean (2000) , in a study of over 60,000 brokerage accounts during 1991-96, document the losses that are likely attributable to overconfidence, finding that those trading the most earned the least on a risk-adjusted basis. A survey or experimental setting, however, has the advantage of allowing for a direct test of the relationship between overconfidence and trading. This paper builds on previous survey and experimental work in this context (Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) , Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) and Glaser and Weber (2007) ), but new ground is broken in several respects.
First, the measure of overconfidence employed here is task-specific in the sense that it is designed to influence experimental behavior. Closest to our approach, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) show that excess entry in markets is more likely to occur if payoffs on entry are linked to post-experimental relative performance on skill and trivia tasks. We on the other hand tie signal accuracy to pre-experimental (and unknown to participants) relative performance on general knowledge questions. In both cases, greater overconfidence is likely to lead to aggressive behavior in pursuit of higher wealth. We argue that this aspect of our experimental design is a key driver of the results generated. 2 Second, the experimental design also facilitates investigation of a possible gender effect. Evidence suggests that men are more predisposed to overconfidence (Lundeberg, Fox and Punccohar (1994) ), perhaps in part due to the fact that self-attribution bias (Miller and Ross (1975) ), the tendency to ascribe success to personal effort and failure to external forces, is less pronounced for women (Beyer (1990) ). Differences in overconfidence between genders seem to be greater when tasks are perceived to be in the masculine domain (e.g., Beyer and Bowden (1997) ). Indeed Barber and Odean (2001) find that men trade 45% more than women, resulting in lower risk-adjusted portfolio returns. 3 In the present experiment gender-based differences in trading activity are tested for, and, to the extent that they exist, it is possible to consider whether overconfidence is the only driving force. We conjecture that other forces may be at play. For example, there is evidence that in mixed groups women are less assertive than men (Carli (2001) ). And the finding that men tend to be less riskaverse (e.g., Agnew, Balduzzi and Sundén (2003) ) may make them more likely to transact even based on information they know to be incomplete.
Third, we explore the impact of overconfidence both at the level of the individual and at the level of the market. In the latter regard, we investigate whether market-level overconfidence and trading volume are related. Consistent with the dynamics of overconfidence as modeled by Gervais and Odean (2001) , Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) find that, perhaps due to self-attribution bias, market-level volume changes are correlated with market surprises. And past success in prediction leads to greater overconfidence in the future (Deaves, Lüders and Schröder (2007) ) for groups of market forecasters.
The next section of the paper describes the experimental design. Section 3 provides the key experimental results. The penultimate section discusses relevant issues. Finally, section 5 concludes.
Experimental design
This section describes the essentials of the experimental design, with additional details being laid out in Appendix A. Four sessions were conducted at McMaster University in Canada and four more sessions were conducted at the University of Konstanz in Germany using pools of finance and economics students. A series of requested confidence intervals for general knowledge questions with specific numerical answers on a pre-experimental questionnaire were designed to elicit individual-specific levels of knowledge and CBO. Additionally, several questions on this same questionnaire and on a post-experimental questionnaire facilitated construction of BTA and IoC proxies. The pre-and post-experimental questionnaires are reproduced as Exhibits B and D, and Appendix E describes the construction of the overconfidence variables.
In Canada, the sessions differed by gender (holding the average level of CBO fixed), whereas in Germany the sessions differed by average CBO level (low or high) while maintaining a roughly balanced gender mix. After detailed instructions, reproduced in Appendix C, were read by participants and time was taken to answer questions in a neutral fashion, 12 unrelated single-period markets were conducted, each lasting five minutes. In each market traders were endowed with a given amount of a numeraire currency and four shares of a stock. The stock paid a dividend at market-end and afterwards had no value.
Thus, the risk-neutral value was the expected end-of-period dividend.
A computerized double auction market environment allowed students to trade in real time, with participants able to post bids and asks, or act as pricetakers in accepting the best bids or asks posted by others. Before trading in a given market began, each trader was provided with a private noisy signal (it appeared on their screens) on the dividend to be paid out at the end of the market. Further, they were informed that the average signal was equal to the true value of the dividend, and, importantly, that those who had exhibited higher levels of general knowledge (based on conference interval midpoints from the pre-experimental questionnaire) would have more informative signals (on average over the entire session). Subjects were compensated based on their performance in one (of the 12 conducted) randomly selected market. One additional opportunity for reward was made available. In each market, after signals were revealed to traders but before trading began, the participants were asked to predict dividends. The individual performing best in this regard received an additional cash supplement. After the completion of all markets, a post-experimental questionnaire was filled out by the subjects, after which subjects were paid their (domestic) cash.
Experimental results
We begin by providing sample statistics on the three variants of overconfidence and individual-specific trading activity (number of completed transactions), both for the full sample of participants and for pertinent subsamples. As Appendix E describes, CBO/BTA/IoC is constructed such that 0.10/15.50/0.00 signifies proper calibration, lower values underconfidence and higher values overconfidence. Table 1 documents that the subject group as a whole was highly overconfident using CBO, less significantly so using IoC, and neither overconfident nor underconfident using BTA. While all correlations between the overconfidence measures are positive, they are quite low, ranging from 0.091 to 0.212, and only one is marginally significant (at 10%). Thus, as will be discussed later, it seems that these measures might be capturing different aspects of overconfidence. On average subjects transacted 44.6 times per session. There were no significant differences in any of the three overconfidence measures between genders; only in Germany was there a trading activity difference by gender, with men transacting more. With respect to country differences, Canadians had both higher levels of CBO and higher trading activity (primarily from female differences) than Germans. Thus, at the broad-brush level, this accords with our expectation. Further evidence comes from pairwise correlations between overconfidence measures and trades. As predicted by overconfidence models, trading activity was (at least at 10%) positively correlated with CBO and BTA; there was however no significant correlation between trading and IoC.
The first three equations in Table 2 provide evidence on the explanatory power of the three overconfidence measures for trading activity. The regressions reported are at the level of the individual (of which there are 8 x 8 = 64). 4 Looking at equation 1, when individual trading activity is regressed on all three overconfidence measures, both CBO and BTA have independent explanatory power, while the coefficient on IoC is insignificant. When with equation 2 the latter is dropped from the regression we continue to see that CBO strongly matters, while the better-than-average effect matters more weakly (pval = 0.062).
Equation 3 is a simple regression of trading activity on CBO.
Equations 4-7 of 
Discussion
Several issues, primarily suggested by the experimental results, merit discussion.
To preview, these are: 1/ the degree to which subjects are overconfident varies with the measure employed, with pairwise correlations being only weakly positive; 2/ CBO is a more powerful predictor than its competitors in explaining trading activity; 3/ men are not more overconfident than women; 4/ men and women trade about the same amount in Canada, while women trade less in Germany; 5/trades are often at prices at some distance from intrinsic value; 6/ does overconfidence lead to not only trade but also poor portfolio performance?
and 7/ does risk-aversion, as well as overconfidence, predict trade? really quite understood what they were being asked to come up with.
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to believe that at least some students understood what they were being asked for. Yet, even if we take the (say) half of all students who come closest to being properly calibrated as being in this category, we are still not even close to appropriate calibration. Interestingly, the German cohort is significantly less overconfident than the Canadian cohort (0.72 vs. 0.84-0.85). It is possible that there may be societal factors at work (e.g., Yates, Lee and Bush (1997) and Kim and Nofsinger (2002) ). Another factor may be that the German and Canadian cohorts, despite best efforts, are slightly different. The
Canadian contingent is made up of second-year commerce students with an average age of 21. The German contingent is somewhat older (24) and more heterogeneous (with students doing degrees in mathematical finance, economics, public business administration and international economics). 8 A final possibility is that the nature of confidence intervals was (again, despite best intentions) less effectively explained in Canada than in Germany. 9
The other possible problem is the nature of calibration tests themselves. 10 Gigerenzer (1991) argues that overconfidence, when calculated on the basis of calibration tests, is vastly overstated, showing that overconfidence can be made to disappear if the testing procedure is reframed. If subjects are asked for certainty levels they are overconfident, but if asked for frequency success they are properly calibrated. Despite these concerns, while absolute overconfidence may be overstated using CBO, there is no reason to believe that relative overconfidence levels do not reflect true differences between individuals, and of course it is relative levels that regression analysis relies on.
CBO is a more powerful predictor than its competitors in explaining trading
activity. This result differs from previous results in the literature. Most notably, Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) in their experiment consider the impact of CBO (measured, as in the present experiment, prior to the participation of students in a series of trading sessions), finding that it does not lead to an increase in trading intensity, though it does serve to significantly reduce profits. 11 Glaser and Weber (2007) combine data from naturally-occurring markets with information elicited from a survey. Using trading data from online brokerage accounts and psychometric data obtained from the same group of investors who responded to an online questionnaire, they correlate various measures of trading activity with a number of metrics of overconfidence. While there is solid evidence that those who are most subject to BTA trade more, there is little such corresponding evidence for those with higher CBO.
One interpretation of the variance in results is that CBO impacts trading here due to the nature of the experimental design. Specifically, the design provides a reason for overconfident traders to think that their signals are more informative. 12 In previous experimental work where private information is provided, there are either no differences in signal quality (Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) ) or, when differences in quality exist, signals are randomly assigned (Kirchler and Maciejovsky (2002) ). Under such circumstances, it is not clear why an overconfident trader should believe that her private information is more informative than the next trader's. Her ability after all had nothing to do with signal quality. We take our cue from naturally-occurring markets where many, through some form of analysis, generate their own information. In the present experiment, even if there is no difference between individuals in terms of knowledge, overconfident people will tend to think that their answers were more accurate, implying that their signals are more revealing, and thus trade accordingly. 13 An alternative interpretation is that BTA is being let in "through the back door," since the driver is people's belief that they have performed better than others. In truth it is impossible to extricate the two, so BTA may be operating both directly through its own question as well as indirectly through the stated signal accuracy component of the experiment.
Related to this issue is the possibility that it is not overconfidence (whatever its manifestation) but rather confidence that is driving the results. If there is little or no variation in knowledge, variations in overconfidence and confidence will coalesce. In line with this view, Bloomfield, Libby and Nelson (1996) present laboratory results relating confidence to trade. To test this possibility, we constructed a metric for confidence, and then proceeded to regress trading activity on both confidence and overconfidence. 14 From this unreported regression it is clear that overconfidence is the key determinant (pvalue (0.005) while confidence is far from significant. 15
3. Men are not more overconfident than women. As mentioned earlier, the literature suggests that men are more overconfident than women. For example, Bhandari and Deaves (2006) , in a survey of defined contribution pension plan members, which, among other things, tested investment knowledge and confidence in that knowledge, found that men were more overconfident than women in this realm. And yet p-values of gender difference (shown in Table 1) indicate there is no evidence supporting a gender gap in our data. We conjecture that the reason for the inconsistency is the nature of the participant pool. Could it be that women who are attracted to "male" disciplines such as economics, finance and business are more overconfident than the overall female population, even as overconfident as is the typical male? whereas, in Germany, where males and females trade together, despite the fact that trading is done anonymously, with no one being able to observe the actions of others, males trade substantially (50%) more. Perhaps the presence of males in the same room somehow inhibits the behavior of women. As mentioned earlier, in mixed groups women tend to be less successful in exerting influence and taking on a leadership role (Carli (2001) Over all markets, the average ex post risk premium ((dividend-mean price)/mean price) was 34%. 17 Nevertheless it is comforting that price convergence typically occurred during a market. In an unreported regression of the change in the median price (from the first 50% of all trades in a market to the last 50% in the same market) on the gap between the dividend and the early (first 50% of trades) median price, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant at close to 1%.
Does overconfidence lead to not only trade but also poor portfolio performance?
Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget (2005) end-of-market post-dividend cash balance (for each individual), is regressed on CBO and prediction error (the sum of absolute differences between dividend predictions and realizations). While the coefficient on CBO is insignificant, by dropping the first or first two market(s) (during which time we conjecture participants were developing a feel for the environment, leading to excessive noise), the coefficient becomes significantly negative (pval=0.078 or 0.003). 19 The inference to be drawn is that overconfident traders perform poorly as they are too liable to make trades at unprofitable prices (and an inability to forecast dividends contributes to the problem). 20
Does risk-aversion, as well as overconfidence, predict trade? Some of our
sessions are stratified by gender. Given that men are less risk-averse than women (e.g., Bhandari and Deaves (2008) ), it could be that trading differences are partly due to differences in risk-aversion. Risk-aversion lowers the price that someone is willing to pay for future cashflows: the resultant risk premium is technically reflected by the fact that the pricing kernel shifts the mean of the objective distribution to the left. 21 Overconfidence on the other hand reduces the perceived risk of the distribution while leaving the mean unchanged. The impacts of high overconfidence and low risk-aversion on trading volume are similar in that they both lead to greater trading volume ). While we have not elicited from participants proxies for risk-aversion, we can investigate the impact of a noisy proxy, the realized risk premium, at the level of the market. The lower panel of Table 3 repeats the regressions of the upper panel, with the inclusion of a market-specific realized risk premium. The first regression indicates that, counter-intuitively, a higher risk premium (greater risk-aversion) is associated with higher volume. 22 Nevertheless, when a country indicator variable is incorporated, the impact of risk-aversion disappears, with country of origin and mean CBO explaining volume (at least at the 10% level) as before. Therefore on balance there is no compelling evidence that risk-aversion matters once overconfidence is accounted for.
Concluding remarks
Taken together, the empirics reported here provide solid evidence that greater overconfidence leads to increased trading activity. This is true both at the level of the individual and at the level of the market. While CBO dominates, BTA matters as well, both directly and indirectly through the experimental design.
On the other hand, we are not able conclude much on the impact of provide some guidance to financial theorists as they continue to refine some of the behavioral models that have recently been proposed. ,t)v(j,s) 
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This upper panel of the table displays the coefficients and p-values (in parentheses) when generalized least squares regressions are done with heteroscedastic errors across trading sessions and autocorrelated errors across markets. The first two rows show regression results for the pooled sample where the market trading volume in session i at market t (denoted as VOLUME(i,t)) is regressed on the average calibration-based overconfidence level of the eight traders in each session (denoted as MEANOC(i)) and (potentially) a country dummy (denoted as COUNTRY(i) where COUNTRY(i) = 1 for Canada and zero otherwise). The third row reports the regression results for German data where market trading volume (VOLUME(i,t)) is regressed on an overconfidence level indicator variable (denoted as H(i), where (H(i)) = 1 for a low level of overconfidence and zero otherwise). The fourth row displays the regression results for Canadian data where market trading volume (VOLUME(i,t)) is regressed on a gender dummy variable (denoted as G(i), where G(i) = 1 for an all-male session and zero otherwise). Analogous to ordinary least squares, for generalized least squares the Buse (1973) R 2 can be interpreted as a measure of the proportion of the generalized sums of squares of the dependent variable which is attributable to the influence of the explanatory variables. The lower panel repeats the above, but now also includes the realized risk premium (RP(i,t) for each market.
APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL DETAILS on EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
Location: There was good reason for using two locations. The experimental design was based on having experimental subjects first fill out an administered pre-experimental questionnaire from which certain measures were calculated which allowed individuals to be assigned to sessions as well as to ascertain how informative their information signals would be. The reason for the preexperimental questionnaire only became apparent to subjects when they were present at the experimental sessions. Once such pre-experimental questionnaire sessions were conducted followed by a "tranche" of experimental sessions, to repeat the same procedure in the same location would likely lead to contamination because of information leakage. Nonetheless care was taken to ensure that the exact same procedure was followed in both locations. It should be noted that the same two experimenters were present at the experimental sessions in both venues to ensure that this was so. In total, 108 students (47 in Canada and 61 in Germany) were invited to fill out the pre-experimental questionnaire. Of these 41 were females (23 in Canada and 18 in Germany). It was more difficult to recruit females than males in Germany because there are substantially more males than females in economics and finance classes at the University of Konstanz.
Pre-experimental questionnaire: See Appendix B for the pre-experimental questionnaire. In addition to obtaining certain information on the students' backgrounds (such as age, educational background and previous experience in financial markets), the main purpose was to see how well calibrated the subjects were. With this in mind, the students present answered 20 general knowledge questions which had objectively known numerical answers. The questions and answers were obtained from a variety of credible sources. The reason for not using investment/market questions was to avoid giving either group of participants a relative advantage because of subject content. In fact an attempt was made to make the general knowledge questions non-culture-specific. Specifically, subjects were asked to supply 90% confidence intervals. Afterwards, they were assessed both on their level of knowledge and on their degree of CBO. Knowledge was measured by summing up absolute differences between midpoints of confidence intervals and correct answers (scaled by correct answers). The lower was the resultant value, the more knowledgeable the individual in question was inferred to be. CBO was assessed by calculating the percentage of times that confidence intervals contained correct answers. The higher was this percentage the less overconfident an individual was inferred to be.
Setup of sessions:
In Canada, from the group filling out the pre-experimental questionnaire, 32 students -16 female and 16 male -were chosen to participate in four experimental sessions. The participants were segregated by gender. That is to say, there were two all-female sessions, each consisting of eight female traders, and two all-male sessions, each consisting of eight male traders. The participants were chosen in such a way that each session had (as closely as possible) the same mean level of overconfidence. The fact that we had extra subjects allowed us to do this efficiently. In Germany, stratification was done on the basis of overconfidence, not gender. Individuals were divided into two discrete groups, the most overconfident and the least overconfident. All sessions were designed to have roughly the same number of male and female participants (with five males/three females attending two sessions and four males/four females attending the other two sessions). Those having experience conducting experimental simulations know that it is virtually impossible to ensure that all invited individuals attend. For this reason (roughly similar) "reserves" had to be invited, and that is why it was not possible to precisely keep constant overconfidence in Canada and gender mix in Germany. Each experimental session began with the students reading the detailed instructions and then being given abundant time for questions and answers. The full instructions are provided in Appendix C. In Canada the instructions were in English, while in Germany the students could choose between German (available on request) and English versions. Some of the German-based students (being foreign students) chose English instructions. In Germany, questions were answered in the language of choice of the student. For numeraire currency we used the term 'baht' supposing there would be few (Thais) for whom the word 'baht' might generate a meaningful connotation. In fact, by coincidence, no Thais participated. Each session consisted of 12 markets (for details see below).
Private signals: The reason for giving task-specific private signals was, as stated earlier, to give overconfident traders a reason to think that their signals were more informative (even if reality often proved otherwise). Traders were informed that dividends were chosen based on a uniform distribution bounded by '1' and '99,' with values rounded to integer values. (More precisely, as will be described below, these two numbers were base values, with actual values being grossed up using session-specific factors.) As for signals, while traders were not given any distributional information in the instructions, our drawing was based on the normal distribution. Looking into our black box in more detail (a possibility not afforded the student subjects), while our dividends and signals were obtained via a random number generator, we repeated our draws (unbeknownst to the students) until several screens had been satisfied: 1/ all (raw) dividends were between 10 and 90; 2/ the average (raw) dividend was between 45 and 55; 3/ the maximum absolute percentage deviation of an individual's mean signal relative to the mean dividend was no more than 5%; and 4/ the most informative set of signals was at least three times more informative than the least informative set of signals (in the sense of the sum of absolute deviations from true dividends). Without the first screen, a situation where all signals were clustered around a very low or very high dividend (thus reducing differences of opinion) could arise. The second and third screens were employed so that traders would not get the sense that the game was rigged in any fashion and that their signals were without information content. Finally, the requirement of the last screen was guaranteed to the traders in the instructions.
Dividends:
All sessions had the exact same set of dividends and signals. To disguise this from participants (since sessions were one or two days apart), we randomly shuffled the market order and multiplied each set of numbers for a session by a random factor. Therefore the only differences were those of sequence and scale. Additionally, a further disguise was deemed necessary. If dividends were revealed to traders at the end of each market, over time it could perhaps have become apparent to traders whether their signals were more or less informative than those of others. (One could never really have been sure though since signal distributional information was not given.) To avoid contamination from this source, all dividends were only revealed at the very end of each session (instead of at the end of each market).
Trading and computerized environment:
To keep subjects separated so that they could not share information, experimental sessions were conducted in computerized environments using the Financial Trading System (FTS) platform. (This program was developed by John O'Brien and Sanjay Srivastava at Carnegie Mellon. The authors particularly thank the latter individual who provided abundant assistance to us as we were setting up the experiment. Note that the latest versions of FTS have been specifically designed to be amenable to asset market experimentation in that a great deal of freedom has been allowed for programming precise experimental designs.) This computerized double auction market program allows students to participate in market simulations in real time. Participants can post bids and asks, or act as price-takers in accepting the best bids or asks posted by others. Traders begin with endowments made up of cash and securities and the program automatically updates portfolios after transactions. Specifically, all traders are endowed with four shares each market. These markets are independent so shares are not carried over from market to market. As for cash, it was scaled at slightly more than twice the level of the maximum dividend. As stated earlier, the base values of the minimum and maximum dividends were 1 and 99. Actual dividends were grossed up by the factors 9, 10, 5 or 8 (depending on the session). This was done so as to disguise the fact that for each session we used the exact same set of draws with all nominal magnitudes being multiplied by a common factor and the order of markets scrambled. So, for example, if the maximum dividend was 891 (99 * 9) the cash endowment was 1800 baht (100 * 2). Once again, there was no carryover from market to market. For simplicity the order book was set at a depth of one, which means that posted orders were erased by better bids and asks. Traders were permitted to transact only one share at a time, and no short selling or margin purchases were allowed.
Payout:
In order to mitigate wealth effects, in advance all subjects were informed that they would be rewarded only based on their performance in one of the 12 markets. This payout market was determined by the roll of a 12-sided die at the end of the session. A conversion was made from the numeraire currency to either euros (in Germany) or Canadian dollars (in Canada) based on pre-selected values designed to keep aggregate payouts within budget (and roughly equal across markets). Conversion rates were chosen so that average payout was about $50 in Canada and €50 in Germany. Sessions were about two and a half hours, so the sums of money involved were quite salient to students.
Prediction:
The prediction of dividends was done by filling out a "ticket" and handing it to the experimenters who recorded the values on a laptop. As an incentive for careful thought, they were told in advance that a $20 (or €20) bonus would go to the trader whose absolute difference between her prediction and the true dividend in the payout market was lowest.
Post-experimental questionnaire:
The full post-experimental questionnaire is shown in Appendix D.
APPENDIX B: Pre-experimental questionnaire Preliminary questions
This part of the questionnaire is designed to collect general information. Such information may help us better understand differences found between participants in this experiment.
1. What year are you in university? 2. What is your sex? (m = male; f = female) 3. What is your age? 4. What is your primary means of financial support? (a = self-supported; b = parent or relative; c = spouse or significant other; d = scholarship, financial aid or other loans; or e = other) 5. How many economics and finance courses have you successfully completed at the university level? 6. How many economics and finance courses are you currently enrolled in? 7. Have you invested in mutual funds for yourself or others? (y = yes; or n = no) 8. Have you traded securities for yourself or others? (y = yes; or n = no) 9. I never buy securities or funds that will underperform in the future. (5=totally agree; 4=agree; 3=neutral; 2=disagree; and 1=totally disagree) 10. I am not able to identify securities or funds with above-average performance in the future. (5=totally agree; 4=agree; 3=neutral; 2=disagree; and 1=totally disagree)
General knowledge questions
Next we would like to assess your general knowledge, and how well you know how much you know. For the following series of questions with clear-cut numerical answers, please provide 90% confidence intervals. Such an interval has a lower and an upper bound such that you are 90% sure that the correct answer lies in this interval. Note that, if your intervals are too wide, the correct answer will fall in your interval more than 90% of the time, while, if you intervals are too narrow, the correct answer will fall in your interval less than 90% of the time. This experiment is concerned with the economics of market decision-making. Using a computerized trading simulation system known as Financial Trading System (FTS), we are going to simulate a trading environment in which you will buy and sell shares of a stock during 12 distinct independent markets. (FTS calls these distinct markets trials.) Based on your decisions you will be able to generate profits. These profits will be paid to you in cash at the conclusion of this experiment. _9_ and _891_ (at increments of _9_) . Each number in that interval has an equal chance of being drawn. After dividends are paid, the stock is worth nothing. The total dividends you will receive in each market are computed as the dividend per share multiplied by the numbers of shares of the stock you hold at the end of that market. The total wealth you have at the end of each market is the summation of your total dividends and your cash holding at the end of that market. The random draws of dividends in all markets are not related to each other. For more details on dividends, please see section 3.
2.e. Market price. Naturally your goal is to maximize your total wealth in each market.
How you choose to do this is entirely your decision. If you choose to do so through the buying and selling shares of the stock, you would make a profit if you are able to "buy low and sell high," namely selling at a higher price than the purchase price. If your trades turn out to be ones involving selling shares at lower prices than buying prices, you would make losses. As to what would be an appropriate price at which to buy or sell, that is a trader's decision. Again we stress that if a trader so chooses nothing compels him/her to trade at all in a given market.
2.f. Signals. At the beginning of each market, before any trading takes place, each trader is given a signal (or private information) regarding the size of the upcoming dividend.
The signal appears in a box on your computer screen. (You must first click on 'Stock A.') For your information, the average signal over all traders in a market is equal to the true dividend in that market. Section 3 provides a more detailed description of the signal.
2.g. Independence of markets.
It is important to stress that you begin each market afresh with the same endowment. More specifically, the amount of baht cash that you have at the end of the previous market is in no way related to the amount of baht cash that you begin a new market with.
2.h. Determination of the payout market and the conversion rate.
The money you take home will be based on your total wealth in only one of the 12 markets you participate in, but in advance you do not know which one this is. This being so, you are well advised to try to maximize wealth in each market. This market (called the payout market) will be randomly chosen by the roll of a 12-sided die after the 12 markets are finished. One of the participants will perform the die roll witnessed by another participant. (You may choose your own representatives if you like.) Note that to keep the exercise within budget a pre-selected conversion rate (dollars for baht) will be applied to convert your baht cash into dollars.
(This conversion rate is the same for everybody, so if you have earned more baht than somebody else you will also earn more dollars than this same person.) The amount will be rounded up to the nearest dollar. Note that the conversion rate has been chosen so that the average trader should make about _$50_, but traders performing much better than average can earn well in excess of this figure. 2.i. Market trading mechanism. While some basic points about trading rules are introduced below, a more detailed description is outlined in section 4. Before any trade can occur, there must be one trader who expresses a willingness to either buy or sell a share of stock at a specified price. An order to buy at $x is called a bid, and an order to sell at $y is called an ask. When you see that a trader has posted a bid at a price which you find acceptable as a selling price, you can express your willingness to make a sale at the posted price via a sell order. On the other hand, when you see that a trader has posted an ask at a price which you find an acceptable buying price for a share, you can express your willingness to make a purchase at the posted price via a buy order.
Dividends and Signals
3.a. Dividends. As said earlier, for each market, the dividend will be a randomly selected number between _9_ and _891_. All numbers between (and including) these values (at increments of _9_) have the same chance of being picked. Note that dividend payout in a given market is determined independently of both past and future dividends in other markets. The buy order will be immediately executed at the ask price. Again, traders are prohibited from buying more shares than they have the cash balance for.
4.i. Updating of cash and share holdings.
After a trade is executed, the trading system will immediately update your cash balance and share holdings and display them on the screen.
4.j. Ends of markets.
At the end of each market, a dividend is paid on the stock. Your trading profit for a market is calculated as your cash plus the number of shares that you own times the dividend payout. For convenience, the FTS system will wrongly show that your dividend is zero at the end of each period. At the end when all dividends are revealed, it is straightforward for you and the experimenters to calculate the true payout attached to the payout market.
Predictions

5.a. Making predictions.
Prior to the beginning of each market, you will attempt to predict the dividend to be paid out at the end of the market. You have been given 12 tickets to enter your predictions for the 12 markets. You should only fill out one prediction ticket at a time, and you should only make your prediction one market ahead! (Failure to do so can lead to a penalty.) When told to do so you will have about 30 seconds to fill out these prediction tickets.
5.b. Prediction errors.
An experimenter will walk around the room to collect your tickets before each market begins. The prediction error for a given prediction is the absolute value of the difference between your prediction and the true dividend.
5.c. Profiting from your predictions.
The participant with the lowest prediction error in the payout market will earn an additional _$20_. 6. As before please complete 90% confidence intervals for these 10 general knowledge questions. would make them neither better nor worse than average, then their BTA would be 15.5. 9 In both countries a roughly 10-minute "lesson" was given to explain what an x% confidence interval meant. The two different experimenters doing these sessions compared "notes" in advance to try to make the descriptions as close as possible. Nevertheless the fact that there were more technically-oriented students in Germany than in Canada may have made it easier for the Germans to grasp this concept. 10 One problem with calibration tests is that underconfidence can arise in the case of easy tasks (Fischhoff (1982) ).
General Knowledge Questions
11 They also investigate the impact of self-monitoring, namely the disposition to attend to social cues and appropriately adjust behavior, finding that high selfmonitors earn relatively larger trading profits. 12 Despite the fact that there is no deception, those thinking that they have more informative signals may or may not be right. 13 It should be noted in passing that overconfident traders would only in fact tend to have more informative signals if overconfidence and questionnaire skill (i.e., knowledge) are correlated (which turns out to be only weakly true -with a p-value of 0.08).
14 Our confidence metric is derived as follows. For each calibration question, we calculated for each individual their confidence interval width scaled by the midpoint. Then on each question we ranked individuals from most to least confident (using a zero to one scaling). Finally we summed up for each individual these ranks to get their overall confidence metric. 15 In a regression of trade on confidence alone, the latter is still insignificant. 16 Part of the reason for this is differences in demographics between the two pools. 17 Note that the interquartile range was from -6.4% to 28.9%. In Canada the average risk premium was 46% while in Germany it was 4%. Much of the reason for the very high Canadian risk premium was that in one of the sessions (no. 1) the figure was a whopping 207%, suggesting some degree of misunderstanding of the nature of the dividend process. While obviously not desirable, this did not necessarily detract from our main concern which was the potential tendency for overconfident traders to trade excessively.
